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Summary
Background Characterisation of the severity proﬁ le of human infections with inﬂ uenza viruses of animal origin is a 
part of pandemic risk assessment, and an important part of the assessment of disease epidemiology. Our objective 
was to assess the clinical severity of human infections with avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus, which emerged in China 
in early 2013.
Methods We obtained information about laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases of avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus infection 
reported as of May 28, 2013, from an integrated database built by the Chinese Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention. We estimated the risk of fatality, mechanical ventilation, and admission to the intensive care unit for 
patients who required hospital admission for medical reasons. We also used information about laboratory-conﬁ rmed 
cases detected through sentinel inﬂ uenza-like illness surveillance to estimate the symptomatic case fatality risk.
Findings Of 123 patients with laboratory-conﬁ rmed avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus infection who were admitted to 
hospital, 37 (30%) had died and 69 (56%) had recovered by May 28, 2013. After we accounted for incomplete data for 
17 patients who were still in hospital, we estimated the fatality risk for all ages to be 36% (95% CI 26–45) on admission 
to hospital. Risks of mechanical ventilation or fatality (69%, 95% CI 60–77) and of admission to an intensive care unit, 
mechanical ventilation, or fatality (83%, 76–90) were high. With assumptions about coverage of the sentinel 
surveillance network and health-care-seeking behaviour for patients with inﬂ uenza-like illness associated with 
inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus infection, and pro-rata extrapolation, we estimated that the symptomatic case fatality risk 
could be between 160 (63–460) and 2800 (1000–9400) per 100 000 symptomatic cases.
Interpretation Human infections with avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus seem to be less serious than has been previously 
reported. Many mild cases might already have occurred. Continued vigilance and sustained intensive control eﬀ orts 
are needed to minimise the risk of human infection.
Funding Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology; Research Fund for the Control of Infectious Disease; Hong 
Kong University Grants Committee; China–US Collaborative Program on Emerging and Re-emerging Infectious 
Diseases; Harvard Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics; US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Disease; and the US National Institutes of Health. 
Introduction
When a new inﬂ uenza virus that can infect and cause 
disease in people emerges, such as the avian inﬂ u-
enza A H7N9 virus, risk assessment is an urgent public 
health priority.1–3 In guidelines from the US Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention,4 risk assessment metrics 
were broken down into ten criteria in three categories: 
properties of the virus, including transmission potential; 
properties of the population, including pre-existing 
immunity and the severity of human infections; and 
ecology and epidemiology in animals and human beings. 
The second category includes one of the most diﬃ  cult 
criteria to assess, but the most important in terms of 
public health eﬀ ects—namely, the clinical severity of 
human infections, which is estimated by measures such 
as the case fatality risk.5 The seriousness of infections 
has major implications for the potential overall severity 
of an inﬂ uenza pandemic.3 However, assessment of 
severity is challenging because typically the most serious 
illnesses associated with infection have a much higher 
probability of being detected and laboratory conﬁ rmed 
than do mild illnesses.6
Human infections with the novel inﬂ uenza A H7N9 
virus were ﬁ rst identiﬁ ed in China in March, 2013, and 
the initial laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases were all patients 
with serious illness.7–9 The earliest laboratory-conﬁ rmed 
cases were clustered around the Yangtze River delta, 
while subsequent laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases occurred 
in neighbouring provinces to the south and north.10,11 
Most laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases occurred in urban 
areas in people who reported exposure to live poultry in 
the 7 days before illness onset.11 Investigation of live 
poultry markets in Huzhou, Zhejiang Province, identi-
ﬁ ed a high preva lence of infection in poultry,12 and 
closure of live poultry markets seems to have been 
eﬀ ective in the control of outbreaks.12–14 Intensive 
follow-up of more than 2500 close contacts of laboratory-
conﬁ rmed cases identiﬁ ed just ﬁ ve potential secondary 
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A H7N9 virus infections,11 which is consistent with low 
person-to-person transmissibility. Pre-existing immunity 
to in ﬂ u e nza A H7N9 virus will probably be low in all age 
groups of the general population.15
Although initial estimates of clinical severity focused 
on laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases,8–10 they could give an 
incomplete picture.16 As the outbreak has continued, it 
has become clear that undetected cases of milder 
symptomatic infections have occurred. First, with the 
assumption that no immunity is present in any age 
group, the pattern in age-speciﬁ c incidence of serious 
cases is not consistent with presumed patterns in 
exposure, implying that severity increases with age and 
that many undetected mild infections have occurred in 
adults.17 Second, six of the 131 laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases 
as of May 28, 2013, were identiﬁ ed via national sentinel 
inﬂ uenza-like illness (ILI) surveillance (including the 
most recent case, reported on May 28 in Beijing), which 
is a population-wide system for measurement of patterns 
in consultation of patients with ILI and virological testing 
for inﬂ uenza virus infections in a subset of patients.18,19 
Of the six cases (aged 2–26 years), only one developed 
pneumonia, and the other ﬁ ve cases had uncomplicated 
illness. Because this surveillance system is based on a 
sampling approach, laboratory conﬁ rmation of the six 
cases implies a substantial number of unconﬁ rmed 
symptomatic infections with mild to moderate illness. 
Our objective was to assess the clinical severity proﬁ le 
of human infections with avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus 
on the basis of available information to inform assess-
ment of potential pandemic risk. We estimated the 
clinical severity proﬁ le in terms of the risk of fatality, 
mechanical ventilation and admission to intensive care 
units (ICUs) for patients who had been admitted to 
hospital, and the risk of fatality in symptomatic cases.
Methods 
Data sources
In China, all laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases of avian 
inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus infection are reported to the 
Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
(China CDC) through a national surveillance system. 
Case deﬁ nitions, surveillance for identiﬁ cation of cases, 
and laboratory assays have been previously described.10 
A joint team comprising staﬀ  from local or provincial 
CDC, or the China CDC, or both, did ﬁ eld investigations 
of the laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases of avian inﬂ u-
enza A H7N9 virus infection. Demographic, epi demi-
ological, and basic clinical data were obtained with 
standardised forms.
An integrated database was built by the China CDC, 
with detailed epidemiological information about each 
laboratory-conﬁ rmed case of avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 
infection reported by May 28, 2013. We used information 
about age, sex, place of residence, dates of illness onset, 
hospital admission, ICU admission, mechanical ven-
tilation, death, and recovery or discharge. 
The National Health and Family Planning Commission 
ruled that the collection of data for laboratory-conﬁ rmed 
cases of avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 infection was part of a 
continuing public health investigation of an emerging 
outbreak and was therefore exempt from institutional 
review board assessment.
Statistical analysis
We used two approaches to characterise the severity of 
infection. First, for patients with laboratory-conﬁ rmed 
infection who required hospital admission for medical 
reasons, we examined the risk of death, admission to 
ICU, and mechanical ventilation. Second, we sought to 
estimate the number of symptomatic cases to form the 
denominator for the symptomatic case fatality risk. 
Together, these measures characterise the clinical 
severity proﬁ le of avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 and allow 
com parison with other inﬂ uenza virus infections. 
Garske and colleagues6 discussed two complications 
with characterisation of severity: the potential for under-
estimation of cases, and incomplete information about 
outcomes during a continuing outbreak. We attempted to 
circumvent the issue of under ascer tainment of cases and 
particularly shifts over time in case ascertainment by 
focusing on cases that required hospital admission. To 
allow for incomplete information about outcomes, we 
used survival analyses to allow the inclusion of all cases 
admitted to hospital in our analysis, incorporating data for 
patients who were still in hospital at the time of analysis 
that would be typical of any evolving, incomplete outbreak.
We estimated the fatality risk for patients admitted 
to hospital within a competing risks framework.20 
Speciﬁ cally, every patient admitted to hospital is 
assumed to either die of the disease or recover. We 
estimated the admission to death distribution (F1) and 
the admission to recovery distribution (F2) with a non-
parametric approach, accounting for the competing 
nature of the outcomes and censoring. We calculated 
the hospital admission fatality risk with the fraction 
F1/(F1+F2) at 6 weeks after admission, and constructed 
95% CIs with a bootstrap approach with 1000 resamples.20 
We used the same non-parametric approach to estimate 
two other serious outcomes of hospital admission: ICU 
admission and mechanical ventilation. Because some 
patients died without requiring mechanical ventilation, 
we grouped two outcomes together to estimate the risk 
of mechanical ventilation or death, for which the 
alternative outcome is recovery without ventilation. For 
the same reason, we estimated risk of ICU admission, 
mechanical ventilation, or death versus recovery without 
ICU admission or mechanical ventilation, or both. 
Hospital admission dates were unavailable for a few 
patients. Additionally, the exact date of ICU admission or 
ventilation was not available in our dataset for a few 
patients. Therefore, we used multiple imputation with 
20 replications to allow for unknown dates of hospital 
admission, ICU admission, or ventilation.21 We ﬁ rst 
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estimated the distributions of time from illness onset to 
hospital admission, and from hospital admission to ICU 
admission or ventilation by complete case analysis. Then, 
we used the derived distributions, truncated by the 
duration of follow-up for a speciﬁ c patient, to impute 
event dates. We estimated risks of fatality, ICU admission, 
and mechanical ventilation with 95% CIs from the 
20 imputed datasets, and estimated the pooled means 
across the imputed datasets with Rubin’s formula.22 
Additionally, we investigated the risk of fatality, ICU 
admission, and ventilation for patients admitted to 
hospital aged younger than 60 years and those aged 
60 years or older. To assess the information about severity 
that was available early in the outbreak for patients who 
had been admitted to hospital, we did retrospective 
analyses of the overall fatality risk on the basis of data 
available on diﬀ erent cutoﬀ  dates in April and May, 2013.
To put the clinical severity proﬁ le into proper context—
ie, by providing a denominator consisting of all infected 
and symptomatic cases—we estimated the number of 
sympto matic inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus infections in 
Shanghai and Nanjing (Jiangsu Province) by May 28, on 
the basis of the numbers of cases detected by routine 
virological surveillance at ILI sentinel sites. We combined 
these data with the daily number of all ILI cases reported 
and specimens tested by ILI surveillance in the two cities 
to infer the number of infected individuals who would 
have sought medical care at ILI sentinels (NILI-S; appendix). 
We then used two alternative methods to estimate the 
number of symptomatic infections in Shanghai and 
Nanjing. With method 1, we assumed that health-care-
seeking behaviour of individuals with ILI associated with 
infection with the inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus was the same 
as health-care-seeking behaviour for those with ILI 
associated with the 2009 inﬂ uenza A H1N1 pandemic 
virus infection. We used data from a nationwide sero-
survey and ILI surveillance of the 2009 inﬂ uenza A H1N1 
pandemic virus in China from June, 2009, to January, 
2010,23 to estimate the proportion of individuals with 
symptomatic infections who sought medical care at ILI 
sentinels. We divided NILI-S by this proportion (appendix). 
With method 2, we assumed that all cases of ILI associated 
with infection with inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus sought 
medical care, and we estimated the number of sympto-
matic cases on the basis of the proportions of outpatient 
consultations at the sentinel locations compared with the 
total number of consultations in Shanghai and Nanjing 
(appendix). After estimating the number of mild cases in 
Shanghai and Nanjing, we extrapolated our estimate to 
the rest of mainland China on the basis of the proportion 
of patients with H7N9 admitted to hospital in those two 
cities (ie, pro rata). Statistical analyses were done in R 
(version 3.0.1).
Role of the funding source 
The sponsors of the study had no role in study design, data 
collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of 
the report. The joint ﬁ rst authors had full access to all the 
data in the study, and the corresponding authors had ﬁ nal 
responsibility for the decision to submit for publication.
Results 
As of May 28, 2013, 131 laboratory-conﬁ rmed human 
cases of avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 infection had been 
oﬃ  cially recorded in mainland China. Of those, 
123 patients had to be admitted to hospital for medical 
reasons and were included in our analyses. Four of the 
other eight individuals were diagnosed after they had 
already recovered from mild illness, and four who had 
mild illness were admitted to hospital for observation 
(one had been identiﬁ ed through ILI surveillance). 
71 (58%) of the 123 individuals who had to be admitted 
to hospital were aged at least 60 years, and 87 (71%) were 
male (table 1). Table 2 shows estimated overall fatality 
risk and risk of other adverse outcomes. Fatality risk was 
higher for individuals aged 60 years or older than for 
Died 
(n=37)
Recovered 
(n=69)
Unresolved 
(n=17)*
Age (years)
0–15 0 2 (3%) 0
16–59 8 (22%) 35 (51%) 7 (41%)
60–74 16 (43%) 21 (30%) 7 (41%)
≥75 13 (35%) 11 (16%) 3 (18%)
Men 28 (76%) 47 (68%) 12 (71%)
Delay from illness onset to hospital admission (days)†
0–2 9 (24%) 11 (17%) 3 (18%)
3–6 21 (57%) 49 (74%) 8 (47%)
≥7 7 (19%) 6 (9%) 6 (35%)
Illness onset date (%)
Feb 19–March 31, 2013 18 (49%) 11 (16%) 5 (29%)
April 1–14, 2013 15 (41%) 44 (64%) 8 (47%)
April 15–May 3, 2013 4 (11%) 14 (20%) 4 (24%)
Residence
Urban 32 (86%) 42 (61%) 14 (82%)
Rural 5 (14%) 27 (39%) 3 (18%)
Data are n (%). *As of May 28, 17 patients had not died but their disease had not 
resolved either. †Admission date not known for three patients who recovered.
Table 1: Characteristics of 123 patients with laboratory-conﬁ rmed infection 
with avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus who were admitted to hospital
See Online for appendix
All ages Aged <60 years Aged ≥60 years
Fatality risk 36% (26–45) 18% (6–29) 49% (36–63)
Risk of mechanical ventilation* or fatality 69% (60–77) 53% (39–68) 80% (71–90)
Risk of admission to intensive care unit†, mechanical 
ventilation*, or fatality
83% (76–90) 75% (63–87) 89% (81–97)
Data in parentheses are 95% CIs. 95% CIs were estimated with bootstrapping with 1000 resamples. Accounting for 
incomplete data for 17 patients who were still in hospital as of May 28, 2013. *Data not available for 15 patients (ﬁ ve 
aged <60 years; ten aged ≥60 years). †Data not available for 13 patients (four aged <60 years; nine aged ≥60 years).
Table 2: Risks of adverse outcomes for patients with laboratory-conﬁ rmed infection with avian inﬂ uenza 
A H7N9 virus who were admitted to hospital
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younger individuals (p=0·0019; ﬁ gure 1, table 2). For the 
37 individuals who died, median time to death was 
11 days (IQR 6–23). For the 65 individuals who recovered, 
median time to recovery was 18 days (14–29).
71 (66%) of 108 patients for whom detailed clinical 
information was available required mechanical ventil-
ation, and 83 (75%) of 110 were admitted to ICU. We 
used multiple imputation to account for missing data 
for dates of ICU admission for one patient and for 
mechanical ventilation for 23 patients, and censored in 
17 patients who were still in hospital as of May 28. We 
estimated that risks of ICU admission (p=0·08) and 
mechanical ventilation (p=0·0067) were higher for 
patients aged 60 years or older than for younger patients 
(ﬁ gure 2, table 2). We recorded some evidence that 
disease progressed or resolved faster in patients 
younger than 60 years than in older individuals 
(ﬁ gures 1, 2), but the small sample size meant that we 
did not have suﬃ  cient statistical power to warrant 
further investigation.
When we estimated the fatality risk of patients admitted 
to hospital on the basis of information available on 
diﬀ erent dates, we noted that the estimated risk gradually 
decreased (ﬁ gure 3). Uncertainty was initially substantial, 
but decreased with time (ﬁ gure 3), because of the 
increasing number of cases and follow-up of individuals 
admitted to hospital. 
We estimated that 23 (95% credible interval [CrI] 
seven to 58) symptomatic individuals infected with 
avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 sought medical care at ILI 
sentinels in Shanghai up to May 28, on the basis that 
two cases were identiﬁ ed there by ILI surveillance. 
Additionally, we estimated that 40 (seven to 129) sought 
medical care at ILI sentinels in Nanjing on the basis 
that one case was identiﬁ ed by ILI surveillance. With 
method 1, we estimated that about 0·75% of individuals 
with symptomatic 2009 inﬂ uenza A H1N1 pandemic 
virus infection sought medical care. With the assump-
tion that a similar proportion of symptomatic individuals 
infected with avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 would have 
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Figure 1: Fatality risk for patients with laboratory-conﬁ rmed infection with avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus who were admitted to hospital
(A) 123 patients of all ages, (B) 52 patients younger than 60 years, and (C) 71 patients aged at least 60 years. As of May 28, 2013, 17 patients were still in hospital; 
the solid lines will converge when these cases resolve.
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Figure 2: Risks of adverse outcomes for patients with laboratory-conﬁ rmed infection with avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus who were admitted to hospital
(A) 123 patients of all ages, (B) 52 patients younger than 60 years, and (C) 71 patients aged at least 60 years. 
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attended ILI sentinels, we estimated that about 3020 
(95% CrI 900–7800) sympto matic infections had 
occurred in Shanghai and 5310 (880–17 300) in Nanjing 
(appendix). Pro-rata extrapolation on the basis of 40 total 
hospital admissions in Shanghai and Nanjing, as of 
May 28, suggested that 27 000 (95% CrI 9530–65 000) 
symptomatic infections might have occurred through-
out the country as of May 28. This number corresponds 
to a symptomatic case fatality risk of 160 (63–460) 
per 100 000 symptomatic cases. 
About 21% of outpatient visits in the internal medicine, 
paediatrics, and emergency departments in Shanghai, 
and 11% in Nanjing, occurred in sentinel ILI sites. With 
method 2 and allowing for this coverage, we estimated 
that about 107 (95% CrI 33–273) symptomatic infections 
had occurred in Shanghai and 367 (61–1200) in Nanjing 
(appendix). Pro-rata extrapolation on the basis of number 
of hospital admissions in these cities (as in method 1) 
suggested that 1500 (95% CrI 470–4050) symptomatic 
infections might have occurred throughout the country 
as of May 28. This number corresponds to a symptomatic 
case fatality risk of 2800 (1000–9400) per 100 000 symp to-
matic cases. 
Discussion
Our ﬁ ndings represent the most complete picture of the 
clinical severity proﬁ le of avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus 
infections in China so far. We have shown that the 
fatality risk of infected patients admitted to hospital is 
roughly 36%, and that it increases with age. Our ﬁ ndings 
put the early reports of severe laboratory-conﬁ rmed 
cases of avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus infection7-9 into 
perspective. Although previous clinical case series have 
focused on the potential for avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 
virus infection to cause severe illness,7,8,24 we have 
estimated that many mild cases might have occurred. 
Our results thus support continued vigilance and 
sustained intensive control eﬀ orts against the virus to 
minimise risk of human infection, which is greater than 
previously recognised.
Notably, our analysis did not contain a metric of 
conﬁ rmed-case fatality risk. We have previously recom-
mended that this term be avoided for epidemiological 
analysis of pandemic inﬂ uenza viruses,25 and now argue 
that this term should also be avoided for avian 
inﬂ u enza A H7N9 virus. Conﬁ rmed cases are apparently 
biased towards infections associated with serious ill-
nesses,17 although a few conﬁ rmed cases of avian 
inﬂ u enza A H7N9 virus infection were identiﬁ ed through 
sentinel ILI surveillance. Because of this under-
ascertainment, the conﬁ rmed-case fatality risk would 
apply neither to patients admitted to hospital (for whom 
the fatality risk is increased), nor to those with mild 
illness. Shifts in ascertainment of cases with time—eg, 
by increasing the proportion of ILI specimens tested 
every week in aﬀ ected regions—would change the 
conﬁ rmed-case fatality risk, perhaps substantially, 
without any actual change in the underlying clinical 
severity proﬁ le the infection. 
Instead, we used a two-stage approach that was also 
recommended in the 2009–10 pandemic of in-
ﬂ uenza A H1N1 virus to provide a stable and robust 
assessment of severity: estimation of fatality risk and then 
estimation of number of symptomatic infections.26,27 Our 
estimation of fatality risk for patients admitted to hospital 
(36%) is higher than the widely reported risk of less than 
25%.9,10,28–30 Our estimate accounted for the unknown 
outcomes of patients who were still in hospital at time of 
data cutoﬀ . Our estimate is lower than that for cases of 
inﬂ uenza A H5N1 virus infection that has been reported 
in China (65%)31 and worldwide (60% for all laboratory-
conﬁ rmed cases),32 but higher than that for 2009 
inﬂ uenza A H1N1 pandemic virus in China (21%).33 Our 
estimate that between 1500 and 27 000 symptomatic 
infections with avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus might have 
occurred as of May 28, 2013, is much larger than the 
number of laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases. The proportion of 
patients with symptomatic infections with the virus who 
sought medical care was probably higher than was 
assumed with method 1 (which corresponds to the upper 
limit of our estimates) because laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases 
seemed to have faster and more severe disease progression 
than did those of infection with the 2009 pandemic virus, 
and also because residents of the highly developed cities 
of Shanghai and Nanjing were more likely to seek medical 
care than the general population of China. 
The fatality risk of patients admitted to hospital diﬀ ered 
substantially by age. Increasing age is also associated 
with greater severity of patients infected with seasonal 
inﬂ uenza and the 2009 pandemic virus.34,35 However, 
age-speciﬁ c ILI surveillance data were not available to 
allow assessment of age-speciﬁ c risk of hospital 
admission for cases of avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus 
infection. When possible, an ILI surveillance system 
that is capitated—ie, based on known population 
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Figure 3: Real-time estimates of the fatality risk for patients with laboratory-conﬁ rmed infection with avian 
inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus who were admitted to hospital 
Shading shows 95% CIs. On the basis of available information about oﬃ  cially announced cases to each date from 
April 23, to May 28, 2013.
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denominators36 rather than on ﬂ oating consultation 
denominators—would enable improved characterisation 
of rates of ILI in the population; laboratory data for a 
subset of patients could be used to extrapolate the 
proportion of illnesses associated with inﬂ uenza.37 How-
ever, this system would be challenging in most settings 
without a deﬁ ned population catchment.
Reasonable estimates of the fatality risk were available 
by mid-May. During the epidemic of severe acute respira-
tory syndrome, reports of the case fatality risk were low 
when based on number of deaths divided by number of 
cases cross-sectionally before complete resolution of all 
cases, leading to substantial discussion and methodo-
logical development during and after that epidemic.20,38,39 
10 years later, during the present H7N9 outbreak, case 
fatality risks of about 20–25% have frequently been 
communicated,9,10,29,30 which is an underestimate. Clearly, 
more work to disseminate scientiﬁ c methodological 
ﬁ ndings and the wider application in public health 
practice is necessary. We recorded a decrease in the 
estimated fatality risk over time, because death generally 
occurred more quickly than recovery. This issue is a 
limitation of existing methods, and methodological 
develop ments would be welcome.
Our analyses have some limitations. First, our esti-
mates are real time, calculated during the ongoing 
outbreak of H7N9 while some patients remained 
critically ill in hospital. Our estimates of fatality risks 
have fairly wide CIs that will narrow as illnesses resolve. 
Second, although we could estimate age-speciﬁ c fatality 
risks, we could not estimate age-speciﬁ c symptomatic-case 
risks in our analyses; further work is needed in this area. 
Third, our estimates of the number of symptomatic cases 
by two methods were based on extrapolation from the 
sentinel ILI network, and necessitated several simplifying 
assumptions, such as no geographical diﬀ erences in 
ascertainment of patients admitted to hospital and no 
changes in health-care-seeking behaviour in late March, 
and early April, 2013. Our analysis could be biased if 
there were additional undetected hospital admissions 
associated with avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9—eg, because of 
poor access to laboratory testing in some areas—or if 
health-care attendance was increased in view of the 
perceived severity of this novel infection. Fourth, without 
data for the proportion of subclinical or asymptomatic 
infections, we cannot estimate the fatality risk for all 
infected individuals (ie, not just the risk for those 
admitted to hospital). Such information might be avail-
able from serological studies in future.40 Finally, clinical 
information about some laboratory-con ﬁ rmed cases was 
not available, and standardised collection and sharing of 
clinical data would assist risk assessment and treatment.41
In conclusion, our estimate of a symptomatic case 
fatality risk suggests that avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 is not 
as severe as inﬂ uenza A H5N1,42 but more severe than 
2009 inﬂ uenza A H1N1 pandemic virus (panel).51 We are 
not aware of comparative data for the symptomatic case 
fatality risks of seasonal inﬂ uenza viruses, but we 
speculate that they are similar in size to the 2009 
pandemic virus. As with seasonal inﬂ uenza, the severity 
of avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus infection increases with 
age. Our ﬁ ndings will inform risk assessment and health 
policy during the present H7N9 outbreak, and will assist 
preparations for a potential resurgence in human infec-
tions towards the end of 2013.11 Our framework could be 
used for pandemic risk assessment of future avian 
inﬂ uenza viruses that cause disease in people.
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